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THE LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE OF PARTNERSHIP
INTERESTS UNDER IRC SECTION 1031(a)(2)(D): AN
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Vincent John Piazza*
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1984, general partnership inter-
ests were considered like-kind property which could be exchanged
tax-free under Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") section 1031(a). 1
Prior to 1984, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") had tried un-
successfully to convince the courts that the parenthetical clause of
section 1031(a), which excludes certain exchanges of interests from
the definition of like-kind property, encompassed all types of eq-
uity interests. 2 Since the IRC did not specifically exclude partner-
ship interests, judges were very reluctant to adopt the IRS's over-
expansive reading of the statute.' After making very little headway
with the courts, the IRS and treasury turned their attention in
Congress. As a result, in 1984 Congress enacted IRC section
1031(a) (2) (D) which explicitly excludes partnership interests from
the definition of like-kind property eligible for nonrecognition
treatment.4
* LL.M. in Taxation (with honors), 1991, Georgetown University; J.D., 1989, University
of Baltimore. Member of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bars, 1990. Certified Pub-
lic Accountant (Maryland), 1984.
1. Prior to 1984, 26 U.S.C. § 1031(a) provided:
NONRECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS FROM EXCHANGE SOLELY IN
KIND. - No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use in
trade or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property
held primarily for sale, nor stocks, bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust
or beneficial interest, or other securities or evidence of indebtedness or interest) is
exchanged solely for property of like kind to be held either for productive use in
trade or business or for investment.
26 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (1969).
2. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9606 (S.D. Ind. 1963);
Pappas v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1078 (1982); Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045 (1981);
Gulfstream Land & Dev. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 587 (1979); Meyer v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 311 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974).
3. See cases cited supra note 2.
4. The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 77(a), 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (codified
at 26 U.S.C. § 1031(a)), provides in part:
NONRECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS FROM EXCHANGES SOLELY IN
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The legislative history of IRC section 1031(a)(2)(D) reveals that
Congress had two overriding policy objectives for enacting that
provision.5 First, the House Ways & Means and Senate Finance
Committees believed that partnership interests were very similar
to stocks, bonds and other securities or indebtedness and thus
should also be excluded from like-kind exchange treatment.' This
reasoning was not surprising since the IRS had been making a sim-
ilar argument for about thirteen years before this subsection was
enacted.7
Second, Congress perceived an abuse in the like-kind exchange
arena with respect to "burnt-out" partnerships.8 In a burnt-out
partnership, the cash distributions to a partner are insufficient to
pay the tax liability on the income allocable to him.9 This situation
occurred in many tax shelters where the losses incurred in the first
few years of operation were due mainly to unpaid nonrecourse lia-
bilities.10 Since the initial losses often reduced the partner's
outside basis to a nominal amount, many partners were left with a
difficult choice: they could sell their partnership interest and be
forced to recognize large gains, or they could hold onto their part-
nership interests, but then the cash distributable to them would be
insufficient to pay the tax on their share of the partnership's
income.
Accordingly, many investors exchanged their interest in a burnt-
KIND. -(1) IN GENERAL. - No gain or loss shall be recognized on the exchange
of property held for productive use in a trade or business or for investment if such
property of like kind which is to be held either for productive use in a trade or busi-
ness for investment.
(2) EXCEPTION. - This subsection shall not apply to any exchange of -
(A) stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale,
(B) stocks, bonds, or notes,
(C) other securities or evidences of indebtedness or interest,
(D) interests in partnership,
(E) certificates of trust or beneficial interests, or
(F) choses in action.
5. See H.R. RFP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 1233 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 698, 897-98; Deficit Reduction Act of 1984: Explanation of Provisions, S. Print
No. 169, at 243-44, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
6. Id.
7. See cases cited supra note 2. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1984, the IRS consistently
tried to convince the courts that an exchange of partnership interests came within the par-
enthetical phrase "evidence of (an) interest" under section 1031(a).
8. See supra note 5.
9. Karen C. Burke, An Aggregate Approach to Indirect Exchanges of Partnership Inter-




out partnership for an interest in a partnership with much health-
ier cash flow.11 Assuming the burnt-out partnership had a section
754 election in effect,12 section 743(b) allowed the partner exchang-
ing his interest in the target partnership to increase his adjusted
basis in the burnt-out partnership's assets equal to his old basis.'3
Since the section 743(b) adjustment was personal to the target
partner and did not show up on the books of the burnt-out part-
nership, in effect this adjustment shielded the target partner from
future partnership gains.' 4 This technique was particularly attrac-
tive to limited partners in real estate tax shelters who could benefit
from a stepped-up basis attributable to the partnership's nonre-
course debt.'5
Despite these two objectives, House Report number 98-432 pro-
vided for nonrecognition treatment with respect to exchanges of
partnership interests in the same partnership. 6 This implies that
Congress was more concerned with eliminating the bailout from
burnt-out partnerships than it was with fostering the IRS's histori-
cal argument that partnership interests were too similar to stocks
and bonds to be afforded nonrecognition treatment.'7 Before legal
counsel can adequately plan around the parameters of section
1031(a)(2)(D), however, congressional intent must be supple-
mented with prior and subsequent case law.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (PRE 1984)
A. Exchange of Partnership Interests
Miller v. United States"" was the IRS's first reported challenge
to a direct exchange of partnership interests. Miller involved an
exchange of a fifty percent general partnership interest in a tavern
for a twenty-five percent general partnership interest in an auto
supply store. 9 Noting that the statute did not specifically exclude
11. Id.
12. Section 754 allows a partnership to elect to adjust the basis of partnership property at
the time an interest in the partnership is transferred by sale of exchange. I.R.C. § 754
(1986).
13. See Burke, supra note 9, at 468.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 1234 (1984).
17. See Richard J. O'Connor, Recent Court of Appeals Decision in Magneson Signals
Wider Use of Like-Kind Exchanges of Real Estate, 63 TAxEs 431, 433 (1985).
18. 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9606, at 89,450 (S.D. Ind. 1963).
19. Id. at 89,451-53.
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partnership interests, the federal district court judge held that the
exchange was merely a continuation of the taxpayer's unliquidated
investment, and therefore, the exchange was tax-free under section
1031(a).10 From the court's brief opinion, it is apparent that the
court was reluctant to expand the literal reading of the statute.
Since Congress did not expressly exclude the exchange of partner-
ship interests from like-kind exchange treatment under section
1031(a), the court did not embrace the government's overexpansive
argument that the parenthetical exception to section 1031(a) in-
cluded all types of equity interests. Moreover, once the court found
that an exchange of partnership interests did not constitute "stock
in trade," it did not inquire into the underlying assets of the part-
nership and therefore did not notice that the ratio of hot assets to
total assets was over sixty-seven percent.2'
The IRS waited until 1972 before it again challenged a direct
exchange of partnership interests. In Estate of Meyer v. Commis-
sioner,22 a father and son exchanged their interests in a general
partnership for interests in a much larger limited partnership.2 3
Both partnerships were involved in the rental of real estate. The
son received a general partnership interest, and the father received
a limited partnership interest.24 The Tax Court, relying on Miller,
held that the son's exchange of a general partnership interest for a
general partnership interest qualified for nonrecognition treatment
under section 1031(a).2 5 The court went further than Miller, how-
ever, by specifically limiting its holding to situations where both
partnerships own the same type of underlying assets, in this case,
rental real estate. 6
Although both partnerships in Estate of Meyer contained the
same type of underlying assets, the court limited its decision fur-
ther by holding that the father's exchange of his general partner-
ship interest for a limited partnership interest did not qualify for
nonrecognition treatment under section 1031(a).27 The court rea-
soned that under the Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, the differences between a general and a
20. 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9606, at 89,453.
21. Id.
22. 58 T.C. 311 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1974).
23. Id. at 312.
24. Id.





limited partnership interest were so substantial that they could not
be considered property of like-kind.2 s Judge Dawson, dissenting,
believed that the majority "illogically bifurcated identical ex-
changes of 'property' which occurred simultaneously. ' 29 Although
he stated that the majority was correct in emphasizing that the
underlying property of both partnerships was rental real estate and
therefore of like-kind, he disagreed with the court's requirement
that the attributes of a general and a limited partnership interest
also had to be of like-kind.30 In retrospect, it appears as if Judge
Dawson was advocating an aggregate theory of partnership taxa-
tion, whereas the majority employed both an aggregate and entity
approach.
Even though Estate of Meyer was a partial victory for the IRS,
the IRS still did not acquiesce in the decision since the court had
sanctified the tax-free exchange of general partnership interests
when the underlying property was of like-kind.3" In fact, the IRS
went so far as to publish Revenue Ruling 78-135, which specifically
stated that an exchange of general partnership interests would not
qualify for nonrecognition treatment under section 1031(a).2 The
IRS's rationale was two-fold: first, the parenthetical language of
section 1031(a) encompassed all types of equity interests, including
partnership interests; 33 and second, section 741 was the exclusive
provision providing for the recognition of gains or losses on the
sale or exchange of partnership interests.3 4 Since a section 1031
transfer falls within the ambit of "exchange," section 741 was pur-
portedly consistent with the exclusion of partnership interests
from nonrecognition treatment under section 1031(a). 5 In Gulf-
stream Land & Development Corp. v. Commissioner,36 the IRS
tried a new twist on an old theme. Gulfstream involved a like-kind
28. Id.
29. Id. at 315.
30. Id. at 315-16.
31. 1975-1 C.B. 3.
32. Rev. Rul. 78-135, 1978-1 C.B. 256.
33. Id. at 257.
34. Id. The ruling states that:
Section 741 of the Code provides, in part, that in the case of a sale or exchange of an
interest in a partnership gain or loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner.
Thus, section 741, which requires recognition of gain or loss, is in conformity with the
parenthetical clause of section 1031(a), which excepts exchanges of equity interests in
financial enterprises from nonrecognition under section 1031.
Id.
35. Id.
36. 71 T.C. 587 (1979).
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exchange of joint venture interests. 7 The IRS argued that joint
venture interests were "evidence of ... [an] interest" and were
within the parenthetical exception to section 1031(a) nonrecogni-
tion treatment.38 The Tax Court, relying on prior precedent, re-
jected this argument on the basis that Congress did not intend to
include partnership interests as "evidences of interest" within the
meaning of the parenthetical exception to section 1031(a). 39 How-
ever, the court's analysis did not stop there. The court also denied
the petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment because an
unresolved question remained as to whether the underlying assets
of the two joint ventures were in fact of like-kind or whether the
assets constituted prohibited stock in trade.40
Two years later, in Long v. Commissioner,41 the Tax Court em-
ployed the same analysis in a similar factual setting. In Long, the
taxpayer had exchanged a general partnership interest for an inter-
est in a joint venture that, like the general partnership, was en-
gaged in the rental of real estate. The court first found that the
exchange of a general partnership interest for a joint venture inter-
est did not come within the parenthetical exception to section
1031(a).
The court then turned its attention to the underlying assets of
each activity.43 Approximately six weeks prior to the exchange, the
partnership had adjusted its profit and loss sharing ratios, thereby
reducing the taxpayer's share of liabilities from $1,426,681 to
$756,680.44 Additionally, the joint venture had borrowed $400,000
before the exchange to increase its liabilities to approximately
$750,000.4 5 To determine whether the exchange qualified under
section 1031, the court relied on an entity theory of partnership
taxation.46 Although the Tax Court acknowledged that section
1031(b) authorized the netting of liabilities to delay recognition of
37. 71 T.C. at 589-91.
38. Id. at 593-94 (citing Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311, 313 (1972), af'd, 503 F.2d
556 (1974)).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 594-97.
41. 77 T.C. 1045 (1981).
42. Id. at 1058-59.
43. Id. at 1066-68.
44. Id. at 1076 n.16.
45. Id. at 1079.
46. Id. at 1071-72; see William M. Keating, Congress Eliminated the Like-Kind Ex-
change of Partnership Interests - Or Did It?, 64 TAXEs 573, 576 (1986).
[Vol. 26:145
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gain on an exchange, 47 the court disregarded the liability adjust-
ments as being motivated solely by a desire for tax avoidance and
therefore lacking in economic substance.48 Accordingly, the amount
of boot received by the taxpayer was computed in accordance with
the provisions of subchapter K and section 752 in particular.49 As a
result, the taxpayer's entire realized gain was required to be
recognized.50
The last significant Tax Court case before the Tax Reform Act
of 1984 was Pappas v. Commissioner.51 In Pappas, the taxpayer
exchanged his general partnership interest in an entity which
owned and operated an apartment complex for a general partner-
ship interest in an entity which owned and operated a hotel fur-
nished and equipped with various personalty.52 The IRS first ar-
gued that the partnership interests represented "evidence of...
[an] interest" within the meaning of the section 1031(a) parenthet-
ical, but the court relied on Gulfstream and Long to summarily
reject this contention. 3
Significantly, the IRS then contended that sections 741 and 1031
were conflicting "exchange" provisions and therefore section 741
should control because it was a more specific statute.5 ' The IRS
used a variation of this theory in Revenue Ruling 78-135 to argue
for the denial of nonrecognition treatment in a like-kind exchange
of partnership interests. 5 5 Despite the IRS's contentions, the court
found that the two provisions were not conflicting, but rather dis-
tinguishable."' Judge Goffe, speaking for a full court, found section
1031 to be a "nonrecognition" provision since it provides that,
neither gain nor loss may be recognized with respect to certain
like-kind exchanges. 57 In contrast, he declared section 741 to be a
"characterization" provision since it provides that a partnership
interest is to be treated as, a capital asset, assuming section 751 is
47. Long, 77 T.C. at 1078.
48. Id. at 1077-80.
49. Id. at 1072, 1080-82; see Keating, supra note 46, at 576.
50. Long, 77 T.C. at 1081-82.
51. 78 T.C. 1078 (1982).
52. Id. at 1080.
53. Id. at 1084-85.
54. Id. at 1086.
55. Rev. Rul. 78-135, 1978-1 C.B. 256, 257.
56. Pappas, 78 T.C. at 1086-87.
57. Id.
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not applicable.5 8 In sum, the court held that the taxpayer's ex-
change fell within the nonrecognition provisions of section
1031(a).5 9
With respect to the hotel furniture and equipment, the court re-
jected the IRS's argument that such personalty should be treated
as "boot" under section 1031(b). 0 The court determined that the
personalty was not stock in trade, as may have existed in Gulf-
stream, and then declined to explore the extent to which section
751(c) may have been applicable because neither party had raised
the issue prior to trial. 1
B. The 1031 Holding Requirement
After Estate of Meyer and throughout the 1970's, the IRS
mounted a more aggressive offensive against what it perceived as a
potential abuse in the like-kind exchange area.6 2 In two closely re-
lated revenue rulings, the IRS took a very narrow view concerning
the holding requirement that must be satisfied before nonrecogni-
tion treatment will be afforded under section 1031(a).6 3 In Revenue
Ruling 75-292, the IRS held that a like-kind exchange of land and
buildings which was immediately followed by a section 351 ex-
change failed to qualify for nonrecognition treatment under section
1031(a). 4 The IRS's rationale was that the property exchanged
was not "held" for investment or for productive use in a trade or
business prior to the transaction. 5
In Revenue Ruling 77-337, the IRS held that a corporate liqui-
58. Id.
Sections 1031 and 741 are not in conflict. Neither of them is an "exchange" provision,
as respondent suggests. Section 1031 is a nonrecognition provision. It provides that
gain or loss realized on certain exchanges will not be recognized. Section 741 is a
characterization provision. It provides that a partnership interest is to be treated as a
capital asset, except as otherwise provided in section 751.
Id. at 1086.
59. Id. at 1086-87.
60. Id. at 1088.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985), af'g 81 T.C. 782
(1983); Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985), af'g 81 T.C. 767 (1983);
Barker v. United States, 668 F. Supp. 1199 (C.D. IM. 1987); Maloney v. Commissioner, 93
T.C. 89 (1989); Wagensen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C..653 (1980); Land Dynamics v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119 (1978).
63. See Rev. Rul. 75-292, 1975-2 C.B. 333; Rev. Rul. 77-337, 1977-2 C.B. 305.




dation under former section 333, followed by the shareholder's im-
mediate exchange of the distributed property for like-kind prop-
erty, also did not satisfy the section 1013(a) holding requirement. 6
The support for this ruling, however, leaves much to be desired. In
brief, the ruling states that a shareholder who receives property in
a section 333 liquidation also acquires the corporate transferor's
holding period under section 1223(1). Then, the IRS cites Revenue
Ruling 75-292 as support for its determination that the transaction
is invalid under section 1031(a), without ever reconciling the ambi-
guity it created. 7
Although Revenue Rulings 75-292 and 77-337 were cast in the
corporate context, they could have. ramifications for partnership
planning opportunities. For instance, why should a like-kind ex-
change of property followed by section 721 partnership contribu-
tion be viewed by the IRS any differently, than a section 351 corpo-
rate contribution under Revenue Ruling 75-292? 6e Alternatively,
why should the IRS view a section 731 liquidating distribution to a
partner, followed by a like-kind exchange of such property, any
differently from the factual situation in Revenue Ruling 77-337?"
In fact, the IRS has relied heavily on these two rulings to press for
denial of nonrecognition treatment to like-kind exchange transac-
tions in the partnership context.70
In Land Dynamics v. Commissioner,7 a real estate developer ex-
changed an orange grove for pasture land. Although the taxpayer
held the pasture land for over one year before he sold it, the Tax
Court nevertheless held that he did not satisfy the section 1031(a)
holding requirement.72 Since the taxpayer was a real estate dealer,
the court found it difficult to accept the taxpayer's position that at
the time of the like-kind exchange he intended to hold the prop-
66. Rev. Rul. 77-337, 1977-2 C.B. 305, 306.
67. Id. One of the common attributes of nonrecognition provisions such as former § 333 or
1031 is the tacking of holding periods under § 1223(1). Nevertheless, the IRS abruptly disre-
gards this similarity and summarily relies on Revenue Ruling 75-292.
68. See Magnesen v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1493-95 (9th Cir. 1985), af'g 81 T.C.
767 (1983) (distinguishing transfer of property to a corporation in return for stock from
transfer to a partnership for a general partnership interest and holding Rev. Rul. 75-292
inapplicable to a § 721 transfer).
69. See Mason v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1134 (1988) (holding that property
exchanged between partners following § 731 liquidation qualifies for nonrecognition treat-
ment under § 1031(a)).
70. See, e.g., Magnesen, 753 F.2d at 1493.
71. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119, 1119-20 (1978).
72. Id. at 1120-21.
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erty for investment purposes.73 Significantly, the court did not find
that a dealer in real estate could not hold property for investment
purposes, but rather that this particular taxpayer "had not submit-
ted one iota of evidence in support of its investor status. .. .
In Wagensen v. Commissioner75 the Tax Court concluded that
nine months was a sufficient time period to satisfy the section 1031
holding requirement. The taxpayer in Wagensen received 18,000
acres of land in a like-kind exchange, used the land for nine
months in his cattle business, and then gave half of the property to
his children as a gift.76 Wagensen is clearly distinguishable from
Land Dynamics, however, because the taxpayer used the ex-
changed property in his trade or business. The court viewed this
productive use of the property as persuasive evidence that the tax-
payer did not intend to dispose of the property when he received it
in the exchange. 7 In fact, the court noted that it did not matter
whether the gift preceded or succeeded the like-kind exchange. 8
The determinative factor was not how long the taxpayer held the
property after the exchange or whether the transaction was com-
bined with other nonrecognition provisions, but rather what the
taxpayer's intent was at the time the exchange occurred. 9
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (POST 1984)
As previously stated, section 1031(a)(2)(D), which was enacted
by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, explicitly excludes the exchange of
partnership interests from the general nonrecognition provisions of
section 1031.80 The intent of Congress in enacting this statute was
two-fold. First, Congress believed that partnership interests were
closely akin to stocks, bonds and other types of equity interests
and should be treated similarly. Second, Congress wanted to pre-
clude nonrecognition treatment with respect to the exchange of
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1121.
75. 74 T.C. 653, 658-59 (1980).
76. Id. at 656.
77. Id. at 658-59.
78. Id. at 660. The court noted "[t]o hold that the exchange in the instant case fails to
qualify for nonrecognition treatment merely because the gift was made after the exchange
rather than before it would exalt form over substance." Id. Cf. Biggs v. Commissioner, 69
T.C. 905, 914 (1978), aff'd, 632 F.2d 1171 (1980) (stating the substance of a transaction
rather than its form determines tax consequences).
79. 74 T.C. at 658-59.
80. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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burnt-out partnership interests."' With these two policy -objectives
in mind, this section will now examine the case law subsequent to
the Tax Reform Act of 1984.
A. The 1031 Holding Requirement
In 1985, the Ninth Circuit decided Magneson v. Commissioner.2
The taxpayers in Magneson held a fee simple interest in an apart-
ment building for investment purposes. The taxpayers exchanged
their fee simple interest for a ten percent undivided tenancy-in-
common interest in another piece of commercial real estate.8 3 As
part of a prearranged agreement, the taxpayers simultaneously ex-
changed their ten percent tenancy-in-common interest for a gen-
eral partnership interest in a California limited partnership. s4 The
taxpayers argued that the exchange of their fee simple interest for
a tenancy-in-common interest should have received nonrecognition
treatment under section 1031(a).s They also argued that their ex-
change of the tenancy-in-common interest for a general partner-
ship interest should also have qualified under the nonrecognition
provisions of section 721.6 In response, the IRS argued that the
initial exchange did not qualify under section 1031(a) because the
taxpayers failed to "hold" the property for investment purposes as
required by Revenue Ruling 75-292.7
The central issue of the case was whether the taxpayers' ex-
change of their tenancy-in-common interest for a general partner-
ship interest was a liquidation of their old investment or a continu-
ation of such investment unliquidated, but in modified form.88 The
court focused on the similarities between the rights of a general
partner and the rights of a tenant in common, 89 as well as the con-
tinuity-of-investment theory underlying Regulation 1.1002-1(c).90
81. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text.
82. 753 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g 81 T.C. 767 (1983).




87. Id. at 1492-93. The court first noted that "Revenue Rulings... are not binding on
this court," but then went on to distinguish the differences between a transfer to a corpora-
tion under § 351 -and a transfer to a partnership under § 721. Id.
88. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 771.
89. Id. at 773.
90. Treasury Regulation § 1.1002-1(c) provides the general exceptions to gain recognition
under Internal Revenue Code § 1001(c). This regulation provides in relevant part:
(c) Certain exception to general rule. Exceptions to the general rule are made, for
1991]
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The court was persuaded in its decision by the fact that had the
taxpayers not contributed the property to the partnership, they
might have been taxed as a partnership, depending on the level of
business activity inherent in the property."1 The court concluded
that, for tax purposes, there was no substantial difference between
joint ownership of property and partnership ownership of
property.2
In his dissent, Judge Tannenwald argued that the majority had
failed to properly analyze the differences between a tenancy-in-
common interest and a general partnership interest, as well as the
impact of California law.93 Judge Tannenwald believed that such
an analysis would have shown that these interests were not of like-
kind.9 4
The Ninth Circuit affirmed after reviewing de novo the Tax
Court's conclusions of law.9 5 Since federal law does not create or
define property rights, the Ninth Circuit analyzed state law to de-
termine the nature of the taxpayers' legal interest in the property
at issue.' The Ninth Circuit found that the differences between a
tenancy-in-common interest and a general partnership interest
were not significant enough to control for purposes of determining
the section 1031(a) holding requirement.9 7 The court then found
that the Magneson's contribution of the property to a partnership
was a mere change in the form of ownership, not a relinquishment
of such ownership.98 Therefore, the court held that the section
1031(a) holding requirement was satisfied and the exchange should
be afforded nonrecognition treatment.9 It should be noted how-
example, by sections 351(a), 354, 361(a), 371(a)(1), 371(b)(1), 721, 1031, 1035 and
1036. These sections describe certain specific exchanges of property in which at the
time of the exchange particular differences exist between the property parted with
and the property acquired, but such differences are more formal than substantial. As
to these, the Code provides that such differences shall not be deemed controlling, and
that gain or loss shall not be recognized at the time of the exchange. The underlying
assumption of these exceptions is that the new property is substantially a continua-
tion of the old investment still unliquidated....
Treas. Reg. § 1002-1(c)(1957).
91. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 773; see Tress. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1963).
92. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 773.
93. Id. at 774.
94. Id.
95. Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1493.
96. Id. at 1495. See, e.g., Aquillo v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-513 (1960).
97. Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1495.




ever, that the court limited its holding to situations where the tax-
payer's original investment and the partnership's underlying assets
are of a like-kind.00
On the same day as it decided Magneson, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed Bolker v. Commissioner.1 ' Bolker involved a corporate liq-
uidating distribution of real property to a shareholder, followed by
a prearranged exchange of the property for three parcels of realty
owned by a savings and loan.102 Based on Revenue Ruling 77-337,
which involved virtually identical facts, the IRS argued that the
requisite holding period under section 1031(a) had not been
satisfied.10 3
The Tax Court, relying on the decision in Magneson, held that
the mere fact that the section 1031 exchange was preceded by a
tax-free corporate liquidation was insufficient to destroy the valid-
ity of the like-kind exchange.10 4 In affirming, the Ninth Circuit em-
phasized that the section 1031(a) holding requirement only re-
quires that the taxpayer not intend to use the investment for
personal purposes or intend to liquidate it, not that the taxpayer
has to intend to hold the property indefinitely. 0 5
In both Magneson and Bolker the IRS attempted to invoke the
step transaction doctrine. 06 In Magneson, the Ninth Circuit found
that even if the step transaction doctrine was applicable, the un-
derlying property was of like-kind, and therefore the application of
the doctrine would have had no effect.10 7 In other words, if the in-
termediate steps in Magneson were collapsed, there would have
been an exchange of a fee simple interest for a general partnership
interest. These two types of interest are considered like-kind
100. Id. at 1498. "[T]he taxpayer must show. . . that the purpose of the partnership is to
hold the property for investment, and that the total assets of the partnership are predomi-
nantly of like kind to the taxpayer's original investment." Id.
101. 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985), af'g 81 T.C. 782 (1983).
102. Bolker, 81 T.C. at 790-794.
103. Id. at 804.
104. Id. at 805. The Magneson case involved a § 1031 exchange followed by a tax-free
contribution to a partnership.
105. Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1045.
106. Id. at 1044; Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1497. Under the step transaction doctrine, the tax
consequences of gains from a sale of property are determined by analysis of the transaction
as a whole. Commissioner v. Court Holding, 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945). Accordingly, "the
incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction," not its formal structure.
Id. at 334. This type of analysis prevents taxpayers from disguising the real nature of their
transactions with mere formalities in order to change their potential tax liabilities. Id.
107. Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1497.
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property.
In Botker, the Ninth Circuit did not address the issue since the
IRS had not argued this theory in the Tax Court below.108 The
Ninth Circuit's decision to avoid the issue is rather perplexing
when one considers that the first eight pages of the Tax Court's
opinion is dedicated to a thorough analysis of the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Court Holding Co. v. Commissioner0 9 and its
progeny. 10
In 1987, the government attempted to use the Ninth Circuit's
rationale in Bolker against a taxpayer who wanted his transaction
to be classified as a taxable purchase.""' In Barker v. United
States,"' the taxpayer attempted to purchase fifty acres of farm-
land in Champaign County. Since the owner of the farmland
wanted to structure the transaction in the form of a like-kind ex-
change, the taxpayer purchased a restaurant in Illinois as replace-
ment property."' Immediately after purchasing the restaurant, the
taxpayer exchanged it for the farmland and then reported his ac-
quisition of the farm as a taxable purchase.1 4 The government
contended that even though the taxpayer did not intend to liqui-
date the restaurant or to use it for personal purposes, he held the
property for sufficient time to come within the purview of section
1031(a)." 5
The district court rejected the government's argument on the
basis that the taxpayer's intent was merely to acquire the restau-
rant as a medium of exchange in order to effectuate the purchase
of the fifty acres of farmland."" Since the taxpayer was a farmer
by trade, the court was persuaded that he did not have the requi-
site intent to acquire the restaurant as an investment or for the
purpose of operating it as a trade or business. "7 Furthermore, the
108. Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1042.
109. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
110. Bolker, 81 T.C. at 796-803. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit even stated that "[t]he Tax
Court emphasized the admitted nonrecognition treatment accorded each individual step in
the transactions, and reasoned that if each step were tax-free, in combination they should
also be tax-free, so long as the continuity of investment principle underlying section 1031(a)
is respected." 760 F.2d at 1044.
111. 87-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (C.C.H) 1 9444 at 89,249 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
112. Id. at 89,249.
113. Id. at 89,249-50.
114. Id. at 89,250.
115. Id. at 89,251.
116. Id. at 89,252.
117. Id. The court noted,
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court, citing Revenue Ruling 77-297, held that the taxpayer had
effectuated a taxable purchase, whereas the other party to the
transaction had negotiated a tax-free like-kind exchange. 1i s The
taxpayer preferred a taxable purchase because certain investment
credits he claimed were dependent on the transaction being classi-
fied as a taxable event." 9
The most recent case in this area is Maloney v. Commissioner,
120
which was decided by the Tax Court in July of 1989. Maloney in-
volved a like-kind exchange of investment real estate between a
corporation and two individual investors. 12' After the exchange,
the corporation was liquidated under old section 333 and the prop-
erty received in the like-kind exchange was distributed to the tax-
payer/shareholder.
22
The IRS attempted again to apply the Ninth Circuit's rationale
in Bolker to Maloney. The IRS argued that the section 1031(a)
holding requirement could only be satisfied if the taxpayer did not
have the "intent to either liquidate his investment or use it for
personal pursuits."'23 A fortiori, since the corporation was liqui-
dated immediately after the like-kind exchange, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's standard could not have been satisfied. 24 The Tax Court dis-
missed this argument by defining the term "liquidate" to mean
reducing the property received to cash, marketable securities, or
other property not of like-kind. 2 5
The IRS also argued that from the shareholder's perspective, the
exchange amounted to an exchange of stock for property. 2 The
court apparently was not persuaded by the IRS's argument that
under a step transaction analysis if the transaction was collapsed
there would be a clear violation of section 1031(a) (2) (B). The court
The Barkers are farmers. It appears that they would have no use for a restaurant in
furtherance of their business. Further, the Barkers only "owned" the restaurant for
perhaps several minutes, for the sale was closed at the same time that the exchange
was made with Keeling. Certainly, such ownership does not connote an intention to
acquire for investment purposes.
Id.
118. Id. at 89,251-52.
119. Id. at 89,250-51.
120. 93 T.C. 89 (1989).
121. Id. at 90-95.
122. Id. at 96-99.
123. Id. at 100.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 102.
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dismissed the argument without discussion and held the exchange
to be tax-free. 12 7
B. Exchange of Partnership Interest
Mason v. Commissioner 12 was released by the Tax Court as a
memorandum decision in June of 1988. Mason involved the same
two partners in two separate partnerships. 129 Both partnerships
were liquidated, and the assets, consisting mostly of real estate,
were distributed to the two individual partners. 30 The individuals
then entered into a like-kind exchange between themselves of the
various parcels received in dissolution.' 3' The IRS challenged the
exchange under section 741 as being, in substance, an exchange of
partnership interests. 132 Much to the taxpayer's chagrin, the court
rejected this view and recharacterized the transaction as a tax-free
liquidation under section 731, followed by a taxable like-kind ex-
change under section 1031(b).3 3 Since the taxpayer was relieved of
liabilities in excess of the liabilities assumed, the taxpayer was re-
quired to recognize $302,680 of capital gain income.13 4
A particularly troubling aspect of Mason is the court's failure to
address the taxpayer's momentary holding of the liquidated prop-
erty prior to the like-kind exchange.' 5 In addition, the court did
not attempt to analyze the exchange under a step transaction
analysis.
IRS Letter Ruling 89-120-23 provides that an exchange of a lim-
ited partnership interest for a general partnership interest, or vice
versa, does not violate the like-kind exchange rules under section
1031(a)(2)(D) if the exchange involves the same partnership. 36
This ruling indicates that Congress's intent in enacting section
1031(a)(2)(D) was to preclude the exchange of partnership inter-
ests in different partnerships, not the same partnership. 3 7
127. 93 T.C. at 102.
128. 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1134 (1988).
129. Id. at 1135.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1137.
133. Id. at 1137-38.
134. Id. at 1138.
135. See James A. Fellows & Michael A. Yuhas, Like-Kind Exchanges: An Analysis of
the New Judicial Doctrine of the Economic Unit, 67 TAXEs 596, 603 (1989).
136. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-120-23 (Dec. 22, 1988).
137. Id. "Congress intended, therefore, to deny like-kind treatment to the exchange of
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Unfortunately, IRS Letter Ruling 89-120-23 was subsequently
revoked, without explanation, by Letter Ruling 89-440-43.' In
Revenue Ruling 84-52, however, the IRS held that a conversion,
within the same partnership, of a general partnership interest into
a limited partnership interest, or vice versa, is tax-free under IRC
section 721.11 Revenue Ruling 84-52 has not been subsequently
modified or revoked, therefore it should be considered good
authority.
Finally, as recently as 1989, the Treasury Department was still
attempting to influence Congress with respect to the like-kind ex-
change provisions.140 Specifically, Treasury wanted a provision en-
acted requiring the parties in a like-kind exchange to hold their
respective properties for one full year both before and after the
exchange in order for the transaction to qualify for nonrecognition
treatment.' 4 1 From a tax planning point of view, it was unfortunate
that this provision was never enacted because it would have added
stability and cohesiveness to the holding requirement cases previ-
ously discussed.142
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO 1031(A)(2)(D)
Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as
possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay
the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes... . . [T]he meaning of a sentence may be more than that of
the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, and no de-
gree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in
which all appear, and which all collectively create. 143
As the above quote from an opinion by Justice Learned Hand
indicates, even great legal minds often have difficulty discerning
interests in different partnerships and not to deny like-kind treatment to the exchange of
interests in the same partnership." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 1231-1234 (1984)).
138. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-440-43 (Aug. 8, 1989).
139. Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157, 158.
140. See H.R. 3150, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. Sec. 11601 (1989).
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 62-79 and accompanying text. But see James A. Fellows & Michael
A. Yuhas, supra note 135, at 603 (discussing how this provision would have effectively "guil-
lotined" the economic-unit/continuity-of-investment doctrine as enumerated in Magneson
and Bolker).
143. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
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the fine line between legitimate tax planning and tax avoidance.
However, it has now been eight years since section 1031(a)(2)(D)
was enacted, and not one court decision has been handed down
that interprets the parameters of this statute. 44
In an effort to provide some guidance, the remainder of this arti-
cle will attempt to define the legitimate boundaries of this statute.
In order to facilitate this analysis the following example and as-
sumptions will be used:
ABC PARTNERSHIP




CASH $25,000 $ 25,000 $ n/a
UNREALIZED REC. 0 50,000 n/a
APT # 1 5,000 60,000 10,000
APT # 2 15,000 75,000 50,000
APT # 3 45,000 100,000 100,000
Totals $90,000 $310,000 $160,000















The IRS has given conflicting signals with respect to the like-
kind exchange of partnership interests in the same partnership.1 4 5
As previously noted, Letter Ruling 89-120-23, which held that sec-
tion 1031(a)(2)(D) applies only to like-kind exchanges between dif-
ferent partnerships, was revoked by the IRS without explana-
144. See supra notes 80-127 and accompanying text. All cases cited therein have been
decided under I.R.C. § 1031(a) prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-369, § 77(a), 98 Stat. 494.
145. See supra notes 128-142 and accompanying text.
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tion.146 Some members of the tax bar have interpreted the IRS'
action to mean that intrapartnership exchanges would fall within
the section 1031(a) (2) (D) exception to nonrecognition treatment.147
However, Revenue Ruling 84-52 and the legislative history behind
section 1031(a)(2)(D) suggest that an IRS challenge to an exchange
of intrapartnership interests may be rather weak.148 Specifically,
the committee reports suggest that Congress's reason for enacting
section 1031(a) (2) (D) was to preclude the tax-free exchange of
burnt-out partnership interests. 149  Since intrapartnership ex-
changes would be consistent with achieving this goal, it appears
that such exchanges should not be foreclosed to investors. More-
over, the fact that Revenue Ruling 84-52 has not been revoked or
modified also supports the argument that intrapartnership ex-
changes should be afforded nonrecognition treatment under sec-
tion 1031(a). 150 In effect, Revenue Ruling 84-52 provides that the
conversion of a partnership interest (general into limited or limited
into general) within the same partnership is not a taxable event.15 1
For example, assume that partners A and B are general partners
in the ABC partnership and C is a limited partner. Further assume
that B wants to convert and/or exchange his one-third general
partnership interest into a one-third limited partnership interest.
The central premise buttressing Revenue Ruling 84-52 is that sec-
tion 721 applies to such a transaction. 15 2 In short, section 721(a)
provides that "[n]o gain or loss shall be recognized to a partner-
ship or to any of its partners in the case of a contribution of prop-
erty to the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partner-
ship."' 53 Accordingly, in the context of a conversion, Revenue
Ruling 84-52 holds that section 721 will govern this example not-
withstanding the possible application of sections 741 or 1001.'5
Revenue Ruling 84-52 and Subchapter K in general are problem-
atic because they do not provide a definition of "property." In the
146. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-440-43 (Aug. 8, 1989).
147. See, e.g., Taxfree Exchanges Under Section 1031, 61-5th Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-
12(7)-(8) (Aug. 12, 1991).
148. See id.
149. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 at 1233-34 (1984); see also, Richard J.
O'Connor, Recent Court of Appeals Decision in Magneson Signals Wider use of Like-Kind
Exchanges of Real Estate, 63 TAXEs 431 (1985).
150. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
151. Rev. Rul. 84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157, 157-58.
152. Id. at 158.
153. IR.C. § 721(a) (1986).
154. Rev. Rul. 84-52 at 158.
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:145
corporate context, property is defined in section 317 to include al-
most anything other than an interest in the corporate entity it-
self.155 If the same definition of property applies in the context of
section 721, then any conversion and/or exchange of an in-
trapartnership interest would not be tax-free.
Assuming, arguendo, that this definition does not apply in the
context of section 721, then certain additional obstacles must be
overcome. For instance, we initially assumed that the ABC part-
nership had $160,000 of outstanding liabilities and B's outside ba-
sis was $30,000. If as a result of the conversion and/or exchange,
B's share of liabilities is reduced, section 752(b) provides that such
a reduction will be treated as a constructive distribution of money
to B.156 Accordingly, if the constructive distribution of money is in
excess of B's adjusted basis of $30,000, gain would have to be rec-
ognized pursuant to section 731(a)(1). 157 Conversely, if the conver-
sion and/or exchange results in an increase in B's share of liabili-
ties, such increase will be treated as a constructive cash
contribution to the partnership, thereby increasing B's basis in his
partnership interest under section 752(a). 15 8
155. Internal Revenue Code § 317(a) provides in relevant part:
PROPERTY - For purposes of this part, the term "property" means money, securi-
ties, and any other property; except that such term does not include stock in the
corporation making the distribution (or rights to acquire such stock).
I.R.C. § 317(a) (West 1988).
156. Internal Revenue Code § 752(b) provides in relevant part:
DECREASE IN PARTNER'S LIABILITIES - Any decrease in a partner's share of
the liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by
reason of the assumption by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall be
considered as a distribution of money to the partner by the partnership.
I.R.C. § 752(b) (West 1988).
157. Internal Revenue Code § 731(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
(a) PARTNERS - In the case of a distribution by a partnership to a partner - (1)
gain shall not be recognized to such partner, except to the extent that any money
distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership
immediately before the distribution. ...
I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (West 1988).
158. Internal Revenue Code § 752(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
(a) INCREASE IN PARTNER'S LIABILITIES - Any increase in a partner's share
of the liabilities of a partnership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities
by reason of the assumption by such partner of partnership liabilities, shall be con-
sidered as a contribution of money by such partner to the partnership.
I.R.C. § 752(a) (West 1988).
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B. Contributions and Distributions
This section will deal with the four most common like-kind ex-
changes in the partnership context: (1) like-kind exchanges preced-
ing a partnership contribution; (2) like-kind exchanges at the part-
nership level followed by a distribution of the exchanged property
to a partner; (3) partnership distributions followed by a subse-
quent like-kind exchange; and (4) an indirect exchange of partner-
ship interests.
1. Like-Kind Exchanges Preceding a Partnership Contribution
Assume D has a parcel of land with a basis of $20,000, fair mar-
ket value of $77,500, and mortgage of $40,000, which he would like
to contribute to the ABC partnership in exchange for a twenty-five
percent interest. Although the partnership is amenable to acquir-
ing another partner, they have no use for raw land in their rental
real estate activities. Accordingly, they suggest that D exchange his
raw land for a group of townhouses owned by a close and receptive
business associate. D effectuates the exchange and then contrib-
utes the townhouses to the ABC partnership in return for a
twenty-five percent interest.
This type of transaction, a like-kind exchange preceded by a sec-
tion 721 partnership contribution, should fall within the Magneson
line of cases.159 Recall that Magneson involved a like-kind ex-
change of a fee simple interest for a ten percent tenancy-in-com-
mon interest in another piece of commercial real estate.160 Simulta-
neous with that transaction, the taxpayers exchanged their
tenancy-in-common interest for a general partnership interest. 6 1.
The Tax Court's holding rested primarily on a continuity-of-in-
vestment analysis under regulation section 1.1002-1.162 Moreover,
the Tax Court also applied its standard two prong analysis: first,
from an entity approach, were the tenancy-in-common and general
partnership interests like-kind property; and second, from an ag-
gregate approach, was the underlying property of like-kind. 63 Re-
159. See supra notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
160. Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1492 (9th Cir. 1985), af'g 81 T.C. 767
(1983).
161. Id.
162. Magneson, 81 T.C. at 771.
163. See, e.g., Magneson, 753 F.2d 1490 ; Meyer v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 311 (1972),
aff'g 81 T.C. 767 (1983).
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call that the Ninth Circuit found that the first question had to be
analyzed under state law.16 4 Since no other circuit has addressed
the issue, caution would dictate researching state law prior to en-
gaging in this type of transaction.
From a practical standpoint, however, D may encounter several
obstacles notwithstanding state law classifications. First, D's prop-
erty is encumbered with a $40,000 mortgage and the townhouses,
in all likelihood, are also encumbered. To the extent D is relieved
of more liabilities than he assumes, the excess is treated as boot
requiring D's realized gain to be recognized under section
1031(b).16 5
In order to avoid similar results, taxpayers have unsuccessfully
attempted to adjust the extent to which their properties are en-
cumbered before effectuating a like-kind exchange.16 e However, in
Long v. Commissioner, Judge Scott noted that "[a]n agreement to
reallocate the liabilities .. .within 6 weeks of . . [a] like-kind
exchange of property, where an excess of liabilities relieved over
liabilities assumed constitutes boot . . clearly raises some suspi-
cions about the intent of the parties."'167 Judge Scott then found
that adjustments to the partnership's profit and loss sharing ratios,
which reduced the taxpayer's share of partnership liabilities, were
devoid of economic substance and motivated solely by tax avoid-
ance purposes. 6 8 She therefore held that the taxpayer's entire
164. Magneson, 753 F.2d at 1495.
165. Internal Revenue Code § 1031 provides in relevant part:
(b) GAIN FROM EXCHANGES NOT SOLELY IN KIND - If an exchange would
be within the provisions of subsection (a), . . ., if it were not for the fact that the
property received in exchange consists not only of property permitted by such provi-
sions to be received without the recognition of gain, but also of other property or
money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount
not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market value of such other
property.
(d) BASIS - If property was acquired on an exchange described in this section...
where as part of the consideration to the taxpayer another party to the exchange
assumed a liability of the taxpayer or acquired from the taxpayer property subject to
a liability, such assumption or acquisition (in the amount of the liability) shall be
considered as money received by the taxpayer on the exchange.
I.R.C. § 1031(b), (d) (West Supp. 1991).
166. See, e.g., Long v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1045 (1981); see also Karen C. Burke, An
Aggregate Approach to Indirect Exchanges of Partnership Interest: Reconciling Section
1031 and Subchapter K, 6 VA. TAX REv. 459, 464-68 (1987).
167. Long, 77 T.C. at 1077.
168. Id. at 1077-80.
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$853,956 gain realized had to be recognized.169
It should be re-emphasized that Congress's intent behind enact-
ing section 1031(a) (2) (D) was to preclude the tax-free exchange of
burnt-out partnership interests and the use of section 754 elections
in that regard. 170 Accordingly, any attempt to have a like-kind ex-
change between an incoming and exiting partner would fall within
the four corners of the statute, i.e. an exchange of property in re-
turn for a partnership interest.
2. Like-Kind Exchanges at the Partnership Level Followed by a
Distribution of the Exchanged Property to a Partner
It is relatively clear that partners may engage in tax-free 17 ' like-
kind exchanges among themselves. The more significant issue is
what happens once that property leaves partnership solution and
winds up in the hands of the individual partners. 7 2 When will the
partnership's like-kind exchange be considered "old & cold" for
purposes of meeting the 1031(a) holding requirement?
In answering this question, the Tax Court's main concern has
not been the actual time period that the exchanged property is
held, but the intent of the parties at the-time the like-kind ex-
change is effectuated. 173 If the partnership engages in a like-kind
exchange with the intent to distribute such property out to indi-
vidual partners, the IRS will likely rely on pre-1984 precedent. 17 4
Specifically, Land Dynamics implies that if the partnership is a
dealer in the type of property distributed, it would be very difficult
to overcome the factual hurdle of proving that the partnership's
169. Id.
170. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, 1233 (1984); Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984; explanation of provisions, S. Print No. 169, at 243, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. See, e.g.,
George C. Howell, Note, The Gulfstream Decision and the Section 1031 Tax-Shelter Bail-
Out Scheme, 66 VA. L. Rav. 943 (1980).
171. But see Internal Revenue Code § 707(b) for rules pertaining to exchanges of prop-
erty between controlled partnerships.
172. One possible alternative is to keep the property in partnership solution and employ
the use of "schedular" allocations. For example, have the exchange occur at the partnership
level and then specifically allocate the income and expense attributable to the exchanged
property to one particular partner. The property itself is never formally distributed out of
partnership solution. The problem with schedular allocations is that the IRS can challenge
them on the basis that they have caused a constructive division of the partnership. See, e.g.,
Terence Floyd Cuff, Planning for Partnership Exchanges Under Section 1031, 68 TAXEs
339, 341-42 (1990).
173. See Wagnesen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653, 659 (1980).
174. See, e.g., Land Dynamics v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1119 (1978).
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true intent was not designed as an end run around section
1031(a) (2) (D). 75 If the partnership uses the exchanged property in
its trade or business, like in Wagensen, then a subsequent distri-
bution of the property to individual partners may be less suscepti-
ble to an IRS challenge.
171
In Maloney, which involved a corporate distribution, the Tax
Court required the shareholder to show that he did not have the
intent to liquidate his investment or to use it for personal pur-
suits.'" Therefore, from an evidentiary standpoint, if the partner-
ship does not have a business use for the property exchanged, then
the partner receiving a distribution of the exchanged property
should be able to prove a business use. In fact, even in Gregory v.
Helvering, which involved a divisive reorganization, Judge Learned
Hand was willing to accept that a spin-off of corporate assets to a
newly formed subsidiary could have been supported by a valid bus-
iness purpose; but, a subsequent distribution of the new subsidi-
ary's stock to the original shareholder was asking the court to exalt
form over substance. 78 Likewise, while the IRS normally won't
question a like-kind exchange of property among different part-
ners, once that property leaves partnership solution, it may be ex-
tremely difficult for the taxpayer to overcome Gregory and its
progeny.
From a statutory perspective, assume the ABC partnership ex-
changes apartment # 2, with a basis of $15,000, fair market value
of $75,000 and mortgage of $50,000, for a condominium held by the
DEF partnership, with a basis of $20,000, fair market value of
$55,000 and mortgage of $30,000. Under section 1001(a) and Tufts,
the ABC partnership's amount realized would be $105,000, the fair
market value of the property received plus the liability to which
the partnership was relieved.179 Moreover, ABC's gain realized
would be $90,000, its amount realized less its adjusted basis in the
property transferred. However, this gain realized would only be
recognized under section 1031(b) to the extent that the liabilities
relieved of are in excess of the liabilities assumed; in this case,
$20,000.1so As previously noted, if ABC tried to pay down its mort-
175. Id.
176. Wagnesen, 74 T.C. 653 (1980).
177. See Maloney v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 89 (1989).
178. See Gregory v. Helvering, 69. F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
179. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756 (1978), rev'd, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
180. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26:145
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
gage on the property, or DEF took on additional debt to avoid sec-
tion 1031(b), the transaction would be recharacterized to reflect its
true substance."' s Furthermore, ABC's adjusted basis in the condo-
minium received would be $65,000, its old basis plus the gain rec-
ognized and the additional liability assumed.182
If the condominium received in the exchange and $25,000 in
cash were then distributed to B in liquidation of his one-third
partnership interest, several consequences would occur. First, gain
or loss is normally not recognized on a liquidating distribution of
property to a partner.183 However, to the extent B receives money,
a tier 1 asset, his adjusted basis in his partnership interest must
first be reduced to the extent of the cash received."" Therefore B's
adjusted basis in his partnership interest would be reduced from
$30,000 to $5,000 as a result of the liquidating cash distribution.
Secondly, since the ABC partnership retained its unrealized receiv-
ables, no adjustment need be made to B's basis in his partnership
interest resulting from a distribution of tier 2 assets.18 5 Finally, B's
remaining basis in his partnership interest, $5,000, can be allocated
in full to the exchanged property, a tier 3 asset, received in liquida-
tion.186 However, since the asset distributed to B was encumbered
with a $30,000 mortgage, B will be permitted to increase his ad-
justed basis in the property received from $5,000 to $35,000.187
3. Partnership Distributions Followed by a Subsequent Like-
Kind Exchange
The case law that addresses partnership distributions followed
by a like-kind exchange is relatively sparse. Mason v. Commis-
sioner,8 " which was only a Tax Court memorandum decision, in-
volved the same two partners in two separate partnerships. Each
181. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
182. Internal Revenue Code § 1031(d) provides in relevant part:
(d) BASIS - If property was acquired on an exchange described in this section...
then the basis shall be the same as that of the property exchanged ... increased in
the amount of gain... recognized on such exchange.
I.R.C. § 1031(d) (West Supp. 1991). See also Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947)
(liabilities assumed in a sale or exchange are added to the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the
property received).
183. See Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a)(1) (1956).
184. See Treas. Reg. § 1.732-1(b) (1956).
185. See Treas. Reg. § 1.732-1(c) (1956).
186. See id.
187. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
188. 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1134 (1988).
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partnership was liquidated and the assets distributed were subse-
quently exchanged between the two partners. 18 9 The Tax Court
found that there was a valid section 731 distribution followed by a
tax-free like-kind exchange, but for the boot. 190 Interestingly, how-
ever, the court failed to address the partner's momentary holding
of the property received out of partnership solution or whether or
not the step transaction doctrine was applicable.
In Bolker, the Tax Court decided both of these issues in a corpo-
rate setting in favor of the taxpayer.' 9' The court, relying on
Magneson, held that the mere fact that the like-kind exchange was
preceded by a section 333 liquidation was insufficient to provide a
contrary result. 92 Recall that the Ninth Circuit conveniently
avoided the step transaction issue in Bolker; whether other circuits
will be so generous is not yet known. 9 '
Mason is a prime example of the type of disaster that can occur
when a section 731 distribution precedes a like-kind exchange. For
instance, in our original example, assume B receives apartment # 1
with a basis of $5,000, fair market value of $60,000 and mortgage
of $10,000. Since no cash will be received in liquidation, B will rec-
ognize no gain or loss under section 731.194 However, in a subse-
quent like-kind exchange of apartment # 1 for suitable replace-
ment property, B could recognize gain under section 1031(b) to the
extent he is relieved of a liability in excess of any liabilities as-
sumed. 19 5 Therefore, B would be well advised to find replacement
property which is encumbered with at least $10,000 of
indebtedness.
4. An Indirect Exchange of Partnership Interests
A somewhat riskier type of transaction would entail the follow-
ing steps: 1) a like-kind exchange of property among the ABC and
the DEF partnerships under section 1031(a); 2) a liquidating dis-
tribution of such property to partner A and partner D (i.e. a 1/3
189. 55 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1135.
190. Id. at 1137-38.
191. See supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text.
192. Bolker v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 782, 805 (1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985).
193. But see Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1971) (relying on the step
transaction doctrine to reclassify a § 731 partnership distribution preceding a like-kind ex-
change as a taxable sale of a partnership interest).
194. See supra note 183.
195. See supra note 180.
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partner in each of their respective partnerships) under section 731;
and 3) a subsequent contribution of such property by partner A to
the DEF partnership and by partner D to the ABC partnership
under section 721. After the smoke has cleared, the partners on
each side of the initial transaction would have achieved exactly
what section 1031(a) (2) (D) was designed to preclude: a direct ex-
change of partnership interests in different partnerships. This type
of exchange would be extremely vulnerable not only under a hold-
ing requirement analysis, but also under a step transaction analy-
sis. 96 Specifically, should the IRS collapse the intermediate steps,
Gregory and the Court Holding Company decisions would be ex-
tremely difficult precedent for the individual partners to
overcome.
97
The partners could argue that the mere fact that a like-kind ex-
change is either preceded or succeeded by another nonrecognition
event is irrelevant to the determination of whether or not a valid
section 1031(a) transaction has taken place. 98 On the other hand,
the IRS could argue that in addition to a step transaction analysis,
the partnerships' intent, at the time the initial like-kind exchange
was effectuated, was not to hold such property for investment or
business purposes. Even if these hurdles could be overcome, the
partners themselves would have a difficult time proving that their
initial intent was not to contribute such property to the transfer-
ring partnership. Since this type of transaction is assailable by the
IRS on so many different fronts, not to mention the potential lia-
bility issues under section 1031(b), it should only be considered af-
ter all other possibilities have been exhausted.
C. Joint Venture Interests
In light of section 1031(a)(2)(D), counsel should be exceedingly
cautious in the like-kind exchange arena. In the Tax Court's
Magnesen v. Commissioner decision, the majority resolved the is-
sue of whether or not a tenancy-in-common and general partner-
196. Some commentators have suggested that the courts will be reluctant to combine the
Magneson and Bolker holdings in light of Congress's intent behind enacting §
1031(a)(2)(D). See William M. Keating, Congress Eliminated the Like-Kind Exchange of
Partnership Interests - Or Did It?, 64 TAxEs 573, 583 (1986).
197. See generally Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
198. See Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'g 81 T.C. 782 (1983);
Wagnesen v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 653 (1980).
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ship interest were of like-kind by referring to regulation section
301.7701.199 This regulation provides that tenants in common may
be considered partners if they engage in a financial operation or a
venture where profits are divided.200 For example, "if owners of an
apartment building lease space and in addition provide services to
the occupants either directly or through an agent," then the IRS
has the authority to reclassify such an arrangement as a
"partnership." '
'
Accordingly, it would be foolhardy to assume that an exchange
of joint venture interests does not fall within the definition of a
partnership under section 1031(a) (2) (D) merely because a different
label is used to classify such activities. Before property is contrib-
uted to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest, coun-
sel should diligently attempt to uncover the nature and level of
business activity taking place with respect to such property. Other-
wise, the IRS is likely to assert that what is thought to be a rela-
tively straightforward section 721, 731, or 736 transaction is in fact
a taxable exchange of partnership interests under 1031(a) (2) (D).202
V. CONCLUSION
The IRS has historically scrutinized like-kind exchanges and to-
day has even greater statutory and regulatory precedent to use to
invalidate such transactions. As previously noted, the main reason
for Congress's enactment of section 1031(a)(2)(D) was to preclude
nonrecognition treatment with respect to the exchange of burnt-
out partnership interests. Accordingly, until the courts define the
parameters of section 1031(a)(2)(D), tax planning in the like-kind
exchange area should be conservative.
Congress could alleviate a lot of this uncertainty through the in-
troduction of legislation. Specifically, a six-month statutory hold-
ing period under section 1031(a) would add stability and cohesive-
ness to the holding period cases previously discussed. Moreover,
Congress could enact clarifying language stating that section
1031(a)(2)(D) was only intended to apply to a direct exchange of
199. Magneson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 767, 773 (1983).
200. Tres. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1960).
201. Id.
202. But see Steven L. Gleitman & Anatole Klebanow, Restructuring a Partnership as a
Tenancy in Common Allows Partners to Make Tax-Free Exchanges of Property, 40 TAX'N
FOR AccT's 142 (1988).
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partnership interests in different partnerships. This would reduce
the great uncertainty that surrounds intrapartnership exchanges as
well as section 721 or 731 transactions which precede or succeed an
exchange of like-kind property.
The Treasury could also promulgate regulations that establish a
bright-line test as to what level of business activity is needed
before the mere co-ownership of property will be reclassified as a
partnership. Respect for our tax laws, and hence compliance, can
only be enhanced if taxpayers have some objective criteria against
which to measure their affairs. Investors would have a better idea
of when the co-ownership of property will be reclassified as a part-
nership if there was a bright-line rule. For example, the rule could
state that reclassification is possible if more than twenty-five per-
cent of a venture's gross expenditures relate to services. In the al-
ternative, a de minimis rule could be established whereby the co-
ownership of rental real estate valued at less than $500,000 would
be shielded from reclassification. Either of these rules would be in-
strumental in adding stability to common real estate transactions.
Finally, since partnership interests are now statutorily unpro-
tected from recognition treatment under section 1031(a)(2)(D),
courts need to re-think their approach to indirect exchanges in the
context of section 1031(a) and Subchapter K. In brief, the courts
will not longer need to look at both the partnership entity and its
underlying assets to see whether the provisions of section 1031
have been met. Rather, an aggregate approach similar to section
751 may be more useful in ensuring that an indirect exchange of
partnership property does not escape the boot recognition rules of
1031(b).
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